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ABSTRACT 
 
Larisa Svirsky: When You Must Take Responsibility Though You’re Not To Blame 
(Under the direction of Geoffrey Sayre-McCord) 
 
There are many situations where an agent’s responsibility for morally problematic behavior, 
attitudes, or aspects of her character seems to entail that she is blameworthy. There are some 
cases, however, where intuitively claims about responsibility and blameworthiness can and 
should come apart. In this paper, I argue that there is a sense of responsibility that agents have in 
virtue of having an obligation to take responsibility for behavior and features of their psychology 
that are attributable to them. In contrast, for agents to be blameworthy for some bad state they 
find themselves in, there must have been some reasonable expectation that they could have 
avoided that state. I illustrate this distinction between moral responsibility for something bad on 
the one hand and blameworthiness on the other with several cases, with the aim of arguing for 
additional subtlety in our evaluation of agents as morally responsible.
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Introduction 
There are many situations where an agent’s responsibility for morally problematic 
behavior, attitudes, or aspects of her character seems to entail that she is blameworthy. There are 
some cases, however, where intuitively claims about responsibility and blameworthiness can and 
should come apart. Below, I will describe several such cases, and argue that in spite of 
significant differences in these examples, the agents in question are responsible but not 
blameworthy for the same sort of reasons. In doing so, I aim to illuminate a sense of ‘moral 
responsibility’ that is often overlooked, thus allowing for additional subtlety in our evaluation of 
agents. I will discuss what the judgment that an agent is responsible in this sense indicates over 
and above the claim that it would be beneficial in some sense for her to take responsibility, and I 
will consider some cases where taking responsibility seems morally obligatory though one is not 
to blame. Cases where agents have a moral obligation to take responsibility for something that is 
attributable to them (i.e., something that expresses their evaluative commitments) strike me as 
cases where agents just are responsible in an important sense, so I use these phrases 
interchangeably.1  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
1 It is not the obligation to take responsibility alone that entails that one is responsible. There are 
cases of strict liability where one is legally obligated to take responsibility for something without 
one actually having intended to harm anyone or been negligent, and there may well be analogous 
cases involving moral obligation. In at least some of these cases, it seems plausible that agents 
are not responsible, though they must take responsibility. The attributability of the state to the 
agent plays an important role in making it the case that she is in fact responsible for it because 
that relation establishes that the state itself says something important about her. I will say more 
about attributability as a necessary condition for responsibility in this sense later on in the paper. 
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Let us make a first pass at understanding moral responsibility without blameworthiness 
by considering the following case: Suppose the chancellor of a university has had an accounting 
error occur on her watch that costs the university a lot of money. She didn’t personally cause the 
accounting error, and she did everything one could reasonably expect her to do in hiring the 
appropriate staff and more generally overseeing the operations of the university. Although in 
principle the error could have been prevented, it is intuitively not appropriate to blame the 
chancellor for its occurrence, since she didn’t cause it, nor was she negligent in performing the 
tasks associated with her job. Still, in virtue of the kind of job she has, she doesn’t just incur 
duties to do what she can to remedy the accounting error – these are duties that many people 
might have regardless of their role in the situation; she also incurs a duty to take responsibility 
for the error when it happened. The appropriateness of her taking responsibility, moreover, does 
not derive solely from pragmatic reasons that follow from the circumstances she finds herself in. 
In other words, she is not just responsible in the sense that it would be good for the university if 
she took the heat for this unfortunate state of affairs. Rather, the role she plays in the university 
makes it the case that she ought to investigate with an aim of being able to explain how this 
accounting error could have occurred on her watch, and evaluate any university procedures that 
allowed it to happen. This is so regardless of whether there’s much she can do to remedy the 
situation going forward. 
Because of the chancellor’s role within the university, she has a certain kind of standing 
with respect to the accounting error: she is answerable for it. By this I mean that her position 
involves certain standing duties regarding the goings on of the university, and those duties entail 
that when something goes wrong, she ought to be in a position to explain how the thing in 
question could have occurred, and evaluate whether that explanation justifies the current 
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university policies. It seems to me that this means that the chancellor has a kind of responsibility 
for the accounting error, though responsibility in this sense does not entail blameworthiness. For 
the chancellor to fail to take responsibility in such a case would be for her to ignore facts about 
her position and what it requires. 
The Relevant Sense of Responsibility 
I will argue that agents with the ability to explain and evaluate their own behavior, 
attitudes, and traits of character have a type of responsibility that is distinct from but analogous 
to the chancellor’s for those actions and features of their psychology; still, it might be the case 
that they are not to blame for them even when they are bad. Before saying more about specific 
examples where I will argue that responsibility and blame for bad things come apart, however, 
let me first clarify the senses of ‘responsibility’ and ‘blame’ I take to be relevant here. Of course, 
‘responsibility’ has been used to mean a lot of things, in practice and in philosophical literature, 
and many of those senses of responsibility are not the one under discussion. For example, I am 
not discussing mere causal responsibility – the kind of responsibility something has in virtue of 
having caused something else. Of course, causal responsibility also comes apart from blame in 
many instances, particularly in cases where the causally responsible entity is not a moral agent at 
all, but this is not a particularly surprising claim.2  
Additionally, when I say that an agent is responsible, I don’t just mean that we are 
entitled to hold her responsible for pragmatic reasons, where holding responsible involves, for 
example, asking for reparations or a resolution of the situation. There are many cases in which 
holding an agent responsible may be the best thing to do from an pragmatic perspective, and this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
2 Of course, ‘blame’ has also been used to mean a lot of things, and some kinds of blame might 
be appropriate to employ towards e.g., children, animals, and natural disasters. But there still 
seems to me to be a distinctive and central kind of blame that is only applicable to moral agents.  
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may be independent of whether or not she is blameworthy, but it may also be independent of 
whether or not she was actually responsible in either a causal sense or the sense I am interested 
in. Although I emphasized that the chancellor should take responsibility, I don’t just mean that it 
would be good for her to assume certain duties going forward, regardless of whether those duties 
are properly hers. Rather, as agents we have certain standing obligations because we have the 
ability to explain and evaluate our own behavior, attitudes, and traits of character. The existence 
of these standing obligations, like (but not the same as) the chancellor’s role obligation, entails 
that when things that we are involved in go wrong, we have to exercise those abilities, just as the 
chancellor has to investigate in light of the accounting error in order to be carrying out her job 
properly. When I say that these agents must take responsibility, then, I mean something stronger 
than the claim that it would be nice for these agents to assess themselves and their role in a 
situation; rather, I think doing so is required.3 
 Finally, I mean something a bit stronger than the claim that we can attribute bad actions 
to agents without thereby blaming them. This ‘attributability’ sense of moral responsibility 
typically involves seeing agents’ behavior and values as expressive of their evaluative 
commitments without thereby assuming that they had control over which behaviors and values 
they adopted as their own. As Gary Watson writes when characterizing this view,  
“These evaluations [of agents as responsible in the attributability sense] are inescapably 
evaluations of the agent because the conduct in question expresses the agent’s own 
evaluative commitments, her adoption of some ends among others…if what I do flows 
from my values and ends, [my activities] express what I’m about, my identity as an agent. 
They can be evaluated in distinctive ways (not just as welcome or unwelcome) because 
they themselves are exercises of my evaluative capacities” (Watson 233). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
3 In some cases more than others it seems plausible to me that one has a duty to take 
responsibility that is a kind of moral obligation. In other cases, it seems more likely that taking 
responsibility would be beneficial, but it is supererogatory. I will discuss this distinction more 
later in the paper. 
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One thought behind attributability views is that no matter what causal path we follow to come to 
act or feel in the ways we do, those actions and feelings are still ours. Someone who has a 
terrible upbringing may well have not had much of an opportunity to develop certain good traits 
of character, and so it may well be inappropriate to blame him for the unfortunate character he in 
fact has. Nevertheless, Watson here points to a kind of evaluation that still seems appropriate in 
such cases because this agent’s character and actions are still his own, and expressive of his 
evaluative commitments. 
This ‘attributability’ view of moral responsibility will be the most difficult to differentiate 
from my view, as I am discussing responsibility for actions and features of one’s psychology that 
are attributable to agents. I see attributability as a necessary condition for responsibility in my 
sense, but not a sufficient one.4  To see why this is the case, consider the example of someone 
with an eating disorder whose illness is at a stage where it is interfering with her capacity to 
explain and evaluate her own behavior. I think it is plausible to characterize her actions as still 
attributable to her in Watson’s sense. While this is a somewhat controversial point, I take it that 
her engagement in eating disordered behavior is expressive of something about her values. 
Nevertheless, if she is not in a position to answer for her behavior because of the state she is in, 
then I think she is not responsible for that behavior though it is attributable to her.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
4 In the chancellor’s case, the accounting error is not attributable to her, for it is not expressive of 
her evaluative commitments. Thus, she is not responsible for the error because she has an 
obligation to take responsibility for it and it is attributable to her, but rather because she bears a 
relation that is analogous to attributability to the accounting error in virtue of her present role 
within the university. The purpose of the chancellor example is primarily to illustrate that in our 
existing practices, we sometimes hold people responsible for bad things though we think they are 
not to blame for them. There may be several ways to hold agents responsible in such 
circumstances, all closely related but not identical.  
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Whether or not one accepts this example as a case where an agent is responsible in an 
‘attributability’ sense, my aim here is just to suggest that it would be helpful to develop a view 
like Watson’s in further detail, which I take myself to be doing here. What I aim to add to 
Watson’s view is a richer account of why having a morally significant property (e.g., being mean 
or being a person who caused harm) is something you have a duty to acknowledge in yourself, in 
the way I think we are obligated to take responsibility even in some cases where we are not to 
blame. It is not clear that attributability alone is enough to explain why being responsible for 
something is as ethically significant as it seems to be in the context of our practices.5 The 
additional element I think we should add here to an account of responsibility is that to be a 
responsible agent, you must have the ability to answer for those actions and features of your 
psychology that are attributable to you. 
The value of answering for oneself in this way, and of taking responsibility in the sense I 
have tried to isolate, is the value of owning your behavior, attitudes, and character traits ⎯ in 
other words, seeing those actions and features of your psychology as saying something important 
about you. Whether you would have deliberately chosen to be an ungrateful person or a sexist, 
the importance of taking responsibility for those traits when you have them stems not only from 
the fact that they belong to you (as do all sorts of other traits that are not morally significant), but 
also that they are revelatory of your character. When the states you find yourself in are morally 
undesirable, perhaps even by your own lights, it is tempting to say that you ought not see them as 
expressive of your character. If you know, for example, that you have sexist attitudes and wish 
that you didn’t, it may be tempting see this desire to rid yourself of those attitudes as trumping 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
5 What I say here about attributability owes a lot to Angela Smith’s discussion in “Attributability, 
Answerability, and Accountability: In Defense of a Unified Account” (2012), although our 
positive views about what answerability consists in are different. 
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the attitudes themselves in terms of your self-conception. Still, dissociating yourself from your 
behavior and psychology strikes me as inappropriate in such circumstances as well as unhealthy, 
and part of taking responsibility in the sense I have articulated involves preventing this kind of 
dissociation.  
What Being a Responsible Agent Entails 
Being a responsible agent (i.e., an agent who is potentially responsible for her behavior, 
attitudes, and character traits) in the sense I am interested in involves having two related abilities: 
the ability to explain your behavior, attitudes, or traits of character, and the ability to evaluate 
whether that explanation justifies those actions or features of your psychology. I take these 
general abilities to be fairly widespread. Being an agent of this kind then entails that you have 
certain standing obligations to exercise those explanatory and evaluative abilities, particularly 
when something you are involved in goes wrong, and to try to make amends for your 
wrongdoing. Having the general abilities that make a person a responsible agent need not entail 
that one is always able to exercise them successfully. Often when one acts in ways that are 
morally problematic, one is not immediately able to explain why one has done so, or even to see 
that one has done something wrong.  
Still, responsible agents, in virtue of having certain standing obligations, must ask 
themselves why they’ve acted and felt in certain ways; failing to do so can lead to a kind of 
culpable self-ignorance about their moral standing. In the chancellor’s case, involving an 
analogous type of responsibility, the chancellor must investigate what features of the university’s 
policies made it possible for the accounting error to occur, and ask whether those policies are 
justified in light of the role they played in allowing an unfortunate state of affairs to take place. 
The chancellor may not be able to exhaustively answer those questions, but nevertheless, it is 
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part of her job to ask them in earnest. Similarly, I will argue, part of fulfilling our standing 
obligations as responsible agents involves examining some of the situations and states we are 
involved in and asking ourselves how we found ourselves there, and whether we ought to be 
there.6 When we find that we have done or felt something bad, moreover, we must do what we 
can to ameliorate the situation. 
Blame, in contrast, has to do with the fact that often when we act and feel in ways that are 
morally problematic, we could have avoided doing so if we had tried to, and moreover we could 
have reasonably been expected to try. In other words, to be blameworthy, there must have been 
voluntary actions or omissions you could have reasonably been expected to perform such that 
you could have avoided the morally bad actions or features of your psychology that are 
attributable to you. When you (as a responsible agent) are responsible but not blameworthy for 
some particular thing, that means that you are in a position to fulfill your standing obligations to 
answer for yourself, but you could not have been reasonably expected to avoid the morally 
problematic thing that is attributable to you.  
On my view, then, responsibility and blame are not wholly unrelated, but they are 
conceptually distinct. Being a responsible agent essentially involves the capacities we have to 
seek explanations for the way that we act and feel and to judge whether those explanations 
justify those actions and those feelings.7 In contrast, blameworthiness requires the ability to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
6 Of course, examining all such states would send someone on a never-ending (not to mention 
narcissistic) quest to figure out exactly their place in the world. I take it that the states we find 
ourselves in that are most important to take responsibility for are the states that are most 
revelatory of our characters, as well as states that are of great moral significance.  
 
7 By explanation, I don’t have anything particularly cognitively sophisticated in mind. The 
ability in question is roughly the ability to answer the question of why one has behaved or felt in 
the way one has. The only ingredient to these explanations that strikes me as essential is that they 
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avoid certain actions and feelings, and a reasonable expectation of that avoidance. As such, 
responsibility is a necessary condition for blameworthiness, for one could not have been 
reasonably expected to avoid behavior or features of one’s psychology that one was not in a 
position to assess, but it is not sufficient.  
Being a responsible agent in the relevant sense also entails a standing duty to take stock 
of yourself periodically so that you are in a good position to successfully explain and evaluate 
morally significant features of your behavior and psychology. This taking stock of yourself 
involves investigating what your behavior, attitudes, and character are like, and if there is 
something you could reasonably be expected to do to improve those things. If you ignore this 
duty to try to know yourself, you can become culpably ignorant of things you could do to avoid 
bringing about bad states of affairs, such that if those states of affairs occur, you are to blame in 
virtue of the fact that you could have been reasonably expected to prevent them. Of course, not 
all instances of self-ignorance are culpable. If an agent has some reason why it is impossible or 
even simply quite difficult for her to acknowledge certain features of her psychology, she may be 
excused (at least to some degree) for the consequences of her self-ignorance, for it was not 
appropriate to expect that agent to know herself in that way. I will explore such a case later on in 
this paper.  
 One consequence of this view is that responsibility and blameworthiness are not all or 
nothing, for the abilities involved in answering for our behavior and features of our psychology 
and the extent to which we can be reasonably expected to have avoided bad actions, attitudes, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
are at a high enough level of description that they include the agent as such. Being able to give 
an explanation of some behavior at the level of particle physics would thus not suffice for having 
the ability to explain one’s behavior in the sense that I take to be relevant to moral responsibility.  
There is a sense, then, in which these explanations have to capture the sense that the behavior, 
attitude, or trait of character is attributable to an agent, whether or not she acquired them 
voluntarily. 
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and character traits clearly admit of degrees. This seems like a good feature in an account of 
responsibility, blame, and most other evaluative attitudes for that matter; after all, our evaluative 
judgments are often quite subtle, and sensitive to many features of situations agents find 
themselves in in a way that makes a gradational account of those attitudes seem appropriate. 
Moreover, the sense of responsibility I have tried to isolate requires agents to have certain 
abilities to explain and evaluate themselves, which are not plausibly abilities that we are born 
with, but rather ones that develop over time. This means that our judgments of responsibility 
should not only admit of degrees, but should also be judgments we make only with respect to 
those agents who have had the opportunity to develop the relevant abilities and not, for example, 
young children or people who are severely cognitively impaired. These predictions that my 
account yields about which agents are responsible and to what degree thus do seem to track some 
features of our practices of holding agents responsible. 
 Of course, we often talk about responsibility in closer relation to other evaluative 
attitudes, including praise and blame. I do not mean to deny that this is a legitimate use of the 
term, or one that is quite prevalent in ordinary language. Rather, I want to argue that there are 
some cases where blame seems inappropriate, but nevertheless we can meaningfully and 
appropriately ascribe responsibility to an agent. Additionally, it seems in some of these cases that 
agents have a duty to take responsibility, and if they do not fulfill this duty, they fail to recognize 
important facts about themselves.  In some cases, this failure is itself blameworthy because it 
constitutes a kind of culpable self-ignorance.8 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
8 In other cases, it seems plausible to me that this failure to know oneself is unfortunate, but not 
itself blameworthy. At least some instances of psychopathology, which I go on to discuss later in 
the paper, seem to be cases where failing to know oneself in this way is unhelpful but 
understandable.  
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 One might wonder what the judgment that an agent is responsible adds to our evaluation 
of her if we do not ascribe responsibility in order to justify praise, blame, or related attitudes. I 
believe that the ascription of responsibility in such contexts is a call for the agent in question to 
own her actions or features of her psychology, and to recognize their consequences for those 
around her. We can see the nature of this judgment most clearly if we look at some cases where 
agents are plausibly seen as responsible but not blameworthy. Below, I will consider three 
families of cases in turn: “involuntary sins”9, certain instances of psychopathology, and finally 
certain instances of moral luck. 
Revisiting “Involuntary Sins” 
Consider a case of someone with a morally problematic attitude say, jealousy towards a 
friend of hers who recently received a promotion at work. She never directly expresses this 
attitude towards her friend, and moreover, she has done basically everything she can to avoid 
having such an attitude. She knows that she tends to be a jealous person, perhaps because of 
some facts about her upbringing, but she has gone to therapy to understand and ameliorate her 
jealousy towards others. Although our judgments about responsibility and blameworthiness in an 
example like this are not straightforward, the following claims about the case strike me as 
plausible: Even if she has exhausted what she can do about this attitude voluntarily, and even if it 
is not something she expresses to her friend, being jealous of her friend’s success is morally bad, 
and morally bad about her. Angela Smith expresses the significance of a more general version of 
this point about involuntary attitudes as follows:  
“…it is a mistake to try to account for a person’s responsibility for her own attitudes in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
9 I follow Robert Adams in using this locution. Although he uses this term to refer to traits he 
describes as “inherently blameworthy,” I mean it only to refer to states (e.g., attitudes or traits of 
character) that are morally problematic but involuntary. 
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terms of their connection to her prior or future voluntary choices, because that obscures 
the special nature of our relation to our own attitudes: we are not merely producers of our 
attitudes, or even guardians over them; we are, first and foremost, inhabiters of them” 
(Smith 251). 
 
Still, it seems inappropriate to blame the jealous friend for having this attitude; after all, she’s 
done more or less everything she can to rid herself of it. Still, her jealousy is attributable to her, 
and she should be concerned when she experiences it insofar as it is bad (both by her own lights 
and in general). In addition to the responsibilities she has to continue doing whatever she can to 
work on her jealousy, she should ask herself why she has this attitude and evaluate it, or in other 
words, ask herself whether or not it is justified.  
According to my account of the relationship between responsibility and blame, then, it 
would be appropriate to describe the jealous friend in this case as responsible but not 
blameworthy for her jealousy. She is excused from blame in this case because her jealousy is not 
something she could have reasonably been expected to avoid; as I have described the case, she 
has exhausted all of the reasonable voluntary actions and omissions that would have allowed her 
to avoid that jealousy. It is not entirely uncontroversial, however, that an attitude’s being 
involuntary means that one cannot be blameworthy for it. In fact, Robert Adam and Angela 
Smith claim that voluntariness is not a necessary condition for either responsibility or 
blameworthiness. Adams argues that attitudes such as jealousy and self-righteousness are not 
morally bad only insofar as they come from our voluntary actions or omissions; rather, they are 
morally bad full stop. Moreover, Adams argues that we are blameworthy for those attitudes even 
if we have done whatever we can to avoid having them. In other words, blameworthiness extends 
beyond the bounds of the voluntary, and because we can be blameworthy for unfortunate 
attitudes or traits of character that we can’t seem to rid ourselves of, we must also be responsible 
for them.  
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 In response to a view that he attributes to Lawrence Blum, according to which one can 
morally criticize someone for having racist attitudes, for example, but cannot properly blame him 
if they are not voluntary, Adams writes the following: “Perhaps for some people the word 'blame' 
has connotations that it does not have for me. To me it seems strange to say that I do not blame 
someone though I think poorly of him…Intuitively I should have said that thinking poorly of a 
person in this way is a form of unspoken blame. I am not sure, however, that there is only a 
verbal dispute here, about the use of the word 'blame' (Adams 21). Whether or not the dispute 
between Adams and Blum is merely verbal, I think there is an important distinction to be made 
between the claim that an agent is responsible for his “involuntary sins” in the sense I have 
articulated here and the claim that this agent is blameworthy. To get clearer about this 
distinction, we should consider another case. 
Consider a person who is excessively ungrateful for his lot in life. Though he 
acknowledges that others have it worse, and he would like to feel more gratitude for the ways in 
which his life is going well, he finds himself instead resentful of little things that have gone 
wrong recently. He has done what anyone could reasonably expect him to do towards cultivating 
the gratitude he wishes he had, but his ingratitude remains recalcitrant.  By Adams’ lights, this 
person ought to take responsibility for his ingratitude. For Adams, “The acceptance of 
responsibility is important to repentance because it enlists the desire to satisfy one's 
responsibilities in support of the desire to change; whereas if one says, ‘I'm not to blame for my 
ingratitude because I can't help it,’ one takes some of the pressure off oneself by seeking refuge 
in an excuse” (Adams 16). 
According to Adams, moreover, blame is licensed in a case like this because it helps the 
individual to understand the wrongness of his involuntary states, which is important not only as a 
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recognition of the agent’s moral status, but can also be instrumental to the agents’ repentance and 
moral self-improvement. In addition to discussing the importance of the agent’s taking 
responsibility for such a state, Adams sees self-reproach (i.e., a form of blame) as an integral part 
of that practice. As he writes,  
“…if you take responsibility for…[e.g., your ingratitude]…you also do not see it as 
something that just happens to you, like a toothache or a leak in your roof. You see it as 
an opposition that you yourself are making, not voluntarily but nonetheless really, to the 
generosity of the other person and to your own position as a recipient of love and 
assistance. In repentance you repudiate this opposition, not as an evil existing outside the 
inner circle of your selfhood, but as your own; and you reproach yourself for it.” (Adams 
15-16). 
 
 I am unsure how deep my disagreement runs with Adams, but I would describe the case 
as follows: The ungrateful person, insofar as he is capable of asking himself for an explanation 
for his ingratitude, and asking whether that explanation justifies his having this attitude, is 
responsible for having it. Nevertheless, if he has really done all he can reasonably be expected to 
do to eliminate this trait in himself, he is not to blame for it. Recognizing that his ingratitude is 
attributable to him, engaging in the process of explaining and evaluating this trait, and doing 
what he can to be more grateful going forward are vital parts of his taking responsibility. It 
seems inappropriate for him to in addition feel guilt about this trait if he has worked sufficiently 
hard to avoid it, though it may well make sense for him to feel some negative emotion towards 
himself in virtue of his being responsible for a bad trait. Thus, if Adams’ insistence on self-
reproach in a case like this involves claiming that the agent ought to feel guilt about the trait, 
there is a substantive difference between our views. If, on the other hand, Adams simply means 
that the agent must see the morally problematic trait as having something quite significant to do 
with him, and must do what he reasonably can do to avoid having it and exhibiting it, Adams and 
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I are basically in agreement about the appropriate response to cases like this, but have a verbal 
disagreement about the nature of ‘blame’.  
 It seems plausible that a similar kind of reasoning applies in the case of broader social 
attitudes, such as racist or sexist attitudes – that is, agents with racist or sexist attitudes who have 
done what they can to eliminate them (within reason) are responsible but not blameworthy for 
those attitudes.10 Their responsibility similarly stems from their general ability to explain and 
evaluate their attitudes, and they are excused from blame to the extent that they have worked to 
eliminate those attitudes in themselves. This explains an intuition I take to be commonly held, 
namely that agents who are raised in racist environments are typically taken to be less 
blameworthy for their racism than agents who are raised in more progressive environments. This 
seems plausible even when the agents acquired the attitudes via similar kinds of reasoning, there 
doesn’t seem to be a difference in whether the attitudes are attributable to the agents, and 
although the racist attitudes themselves are just as morally bad in either case. The explanation 
offered by my account is that your environment shapes what can be reasonably expected of you 
by making certain morally significant attitudes more or less salient and available.11 For someone 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
10 This is not, of course, to say that someone who acts on their racist attitudes is not blameworthy 
for similar reasons. First of all, in the typical case of a person with explicit racist attitudes, they 
are blameworthy for those attitudes because we can reasonably expect agents to do more than 
they have done to eliminate them; after all, they are typically held in the face of massive 
evidence to the contrary. Secondly, it seems plausible to me that there are different standards for 
what we can reasonably expect others to avoid in the case of actions versus the case of attitudes, 
particularly attitudes that are held involuntarily.  
 
11 For a related view, specifically concerning the connection between feminist critique, 
responsibility, and blame, see Calhoun (1989). An important part of her view is that in 
“abnormal moral contexts” where certain moral information (e.g., that certain practices are 
sexist) might be opaque to the general population, it may be very important to hold individuals 
responsible and in to some sense reproach them though they are not to blame due to the non-
culpability of their ignorance. Holding agents responsible in such contexts though they are not 
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raised in an overtly racist society, perhaps never encountering someone of another race, coming 
to hold anti-racist attitudes is a more significant moral and epistemic achievement than it would 
be for someone who has more exposure to the relevant information.12 
I see my view as a middle ground between the views of someone like Adams, who holds 
that we can be blameworthy for involuntary states and the view of someone who holds that 
voluntariness is a necessary condition for both responsibility and blameworthiness. It seems to 
me that we miss out on something important if we wholly excuse agents for morally problematic 
states that they ought to recognize in themselves, which they can understand and evaluate, and 
which they ought to make amends for exhibiting. Nevertheless, it seems excessively harsh to 
blame agents for actions, attitudes, and traits of character we couldn’t have reasonably expected 
them to avoid. If we avoid blaming the agents in question, we can still say something significant 
about them by saying that they are responsible for a something bad, namely that they ought to 
own certain evaluative commitments they have, whether or not they would have deliberately 
chosen them.  
Responsibility for Psychopathology 
 Certain cases of psychopathology also strike me as cases where agents are responsible 
but not blameworthy for the behavior related to their illness. In general, mental illness is often 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
blameworthy is an important part of making the relevant moral knowledge more accessible and 
thereby changing the moral landscape. As she writes, “…vulnerability to moral reproach is 
necessary to (1) publicizing moral standards, (2) conveying the obligatory force of moral 
commands, and (3) sustaining our sense of ourselves as self-legislators. In abnormal moral 
contexts, excusing excusable ignorance by withholding moral reproach inhibits the publicizing 
and adopting of new moral standards. Thus, in abnormal contexts, it may be reasonable to 
reproach moral failings even when individuals are not blameworthy” (Calhoun 405). 
 
12 I set aside the question here of whether there are interesting differences between explicit racist 
and sexist attitudes and implicit bias and whether e.g., one can be responsible but not 
blameworthy for one’s implicit biases. My inclination is to say ‘yes,’ but to explore this question 
in the detail it requires would take me beyond the scope of this paper. 
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thought of as an excusing condition for responsibility as well as blame, but it seems to me that 
the diversity of the phenomena in question calls for additional subtlety in our analysis of it. 
Consider eating disorders, for example: people with eating disorders might well be in a position 
to explain how they became ill and to know that the causes of their illness don’t justify their 
engaging in eating disordered behavior. As long as their general explanatory and evaluative 
abilities are intact, my account would have it that people with eating disorders are responsible for 
their illnesses. Nevertheless, the difficulty in overcoming an eating disorder makes it 
unreasonable to expect agents to consistently engage in healthy eating behavior early on in their 
recovery.  
 Moreover, part of the symptomology of eating disorders includes a kind of ignorance 
about the severity of one’s illness and one’s capacities to overcome it. The authors of a study 
focused on the competence of anorexic patients to make decisions about their own treatment 
write, “There appear to be two different types of belief described by participants: "factual belief," 
the belief of objective medical facts…and "salient belief," believing the information applies to 
oneself in a way that is relevant to, and has an impact on, decision making” (Tan et al. 177). 
These authors go on to say that these types of belief can come apart; in particular, although 
eating disordered people (in this case, anorexic patients) can be quite good at judging abstract 
facts about their situations, they have trouble integrating those facts into both their self-
conception and their decision-making. This lack of integration plausibly limits what people with 
eating disorders can rationally intend to do, and what others can reasonably expect of them. 
Thus, the difficulty involved in eating disorder recovery as well as this kind of self-ignorance 
(that I take to be non-culpable) both function as excusing conditions for blame for a person’s 
eating disorder.  
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  Nevertheless, these considerations may not prevent people with eating disorders from 
being responsible for their illness in the sense I have tried to illuminate.13 The fact that someone 
is not yet in a position to consistently see her situation clearly need not entail that she is always 
ignorant of what she is doing when she acts, why she is doing it, or whether she ought to do it. 
People with eating disorders may well be able to explain and evaluate their behavior, and even 
see that this behavior causes suffering to themselves and others. Even if they do not engage in 
this kind of explanation and evaluation entirely successfully, moreover, many people with eating 
disorders can still ask themselves the relevant questions about the causes and justifications of 
their behavior. Finally, the practice of taking responsibility for one’s illness not only often plays 
an important role in one’s overcoming it, but additionally, failing to do so involves missing out 
on something important about one’s moral status.14  
This is not, of course, to say that people with eating disorders are always responsible for 
their illnesses. For example, in cases where agents are cognitively impaired because of 
malnutrition, they are not in a position to answer for their behavior, and thus they would not be 
responsible for it in the sense I have described. This seems to me to be the right result, since 
responsibility plausibly requires having and being able to exercise certain cognitive capacities. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
13 These considerations might mitigate an agent’s degree of responsibility to the extent that they 
prevent her from seeing her behavior in context clearly enough to explain and evaluate it. The 
claim I am interested in establishing, however, is not that most people with eating disorders are 
responsible for their illness. Rather, I want to argue that, though people with eating disorders  
aren’t to blame for their illness, they can still be responsible for it insofar as they have the 
abilities I take to be central to responsibility in this sense.   
 
14 One might think that failing to take responsibility when one has an obligation to do so is itself 
blameworthy. It is unclear to me that this is so in every case; in particular, in cases of mental 
illness, acknowledging one’s role in one’s own suffering (not to mention the suffering of those 
close to one) may be so painful that failing to do so would be unfortunate, but perhaps 
understandable and not blameworthy. 
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Additionally, in cases where agents are culpably self-ignorant, they might well be blameworthy 
for their actions because they ought to have acquired the knowledge they needed to carry out 
better behavior or hold better attitudes. The same holds in other cases where it would have been 
reasonable to expect agents to avoid the morally problematic behavior, attitudes, and traits of 
character they exhibit. It does not seem to me, however, that we are entitled to make this 
judgment in typical cases of psychopathology. People do not usually bring about their own 
suffering voluntarily, and the causes of mental illness are not usually within an agent’s control. 
Since blameworthiness requires not only some degree of voluntary control, but also the 
reasonable expectation of its exercise, one is not generally to blame for one’s having a mental 
illness.15 
Taking Responsibility When You’re Unlucky 
Finally, I believe it is appropriate to hold that agents are responsible but not blameworthy 
in certain instances of moral luck. The fact that much of what we do and how we are is not 
within our control, and the fact that we take ourselves to hold agents responsible (and potentially 
blameworthy) only for things that were within their control seems to entail that no one’s actually 
responsible for very much. And yet we do hold people responsible in spite of the apparent 
existence of moral luck: The child raised in Nazi Germany is in some sense unlucky that his 
environment made it more likely that he would come to accept Nazi ideology, and he did not 
choose to be born in that environment; still, now that he has accepted that ideology, he is 
intuitively at fault for doing so. Similarly, when circumstances outside of our control drastically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
15 Although I only discuss eating disorders in detail in this section of the paper, I believe this 
account would apply to other cases of psychopathology that have a behavioral or attitudinal 
component just when the agent has the capacities necessary to answer for those aspects of her 
behavior and attitudes that constitute her illness.  
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affect what we’ve done, regardless of our intentions, we still seem to be accountable for our 
actions. To quote Thomas Nagel, “…there is a morally significant difference between reckless 
driving and manslaughter. But whether a reckless driver hits a pedestrian depends on the 
presence of the pedestrian at the point where he recklessly passes a red light” (Nagel 26). 
The issue of moral luck becomes even more pressing as a problem for our practices of 
holding agents responsible if we consider all agents who are morally responsible for bad things 
thereby blameworthy for those things. Above, I have offered reasons to think that this entailment 
between responsibility and blameworthiness does not hold, and I believe that separating 
responsibility from blame in the way I have described dissolves at least some worries related to 
moral luck. Below, I will outline two types of moral luck, constitutive and circumstantial luck (to 
use Nagel’s terminology), and illustrate them with examples that make clear how my account 
responds to such worries. First, in cases of constitutive moral luck, agents become the kind of 
people they are in virtue of being subject to forces outside of their control (e.g., their 
environments or upbringing).  Although we typically hold people responsible (at least to some 
degree) for the kind of people they are as manifest in the things they do, it is not obvious that this 
is fair given that the way we acquire our characters is, in large part, not up to us.  
Consider, for example, an agent who was raised in a household where excessive guilt and 
apology was expected and reinforced. A child growing up in such a household would be likely to 
develop dispositions to feel guilty and apologize in circumstances where doing so is not 
warranted. This trait is not only harmful to that individual insofar as it is a source of negative 
emotion, but it also irritates those around her. It strikes her friends as self-important that this 
person thinks she is responsible for bad events in the world that have basically nothing to do with 
her such that she thinks she needs to apologize for them. If we compare this agent to someone 
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with a similar personality but without a similar upbringing, however, we are less inclined to fault 
her for her tendencies towards excessive guilt, insofar as we see them as explained by the kind of 
environment that she was raised in. We thus see her as unlucky with respect to this disposition of 
hers; though it would be better if she didn’t have this disposition, it is unclear how to treat her in 
light of the fact that she does. 
Part of this agent’s trouble is, of course, a tendency to take responsibility in excess for 
things in the world that she was not appropriately related to. Nevertheless, I want to argue that 
she ought to take responsibility for her dispositions to feel guilty and apologize, provided she is 
able to ask herself why she has those dispositions and whether she ought to have them, 
particularly when exhibiting them isn’t licensed by the circumstances she finds herself in. Of 
course, this agent is not to blame for those dispositions; her parents expected her to feel bad 
about everything that happened in their household, and to apologize even when she wasn’t at 
fault.16 It is understandable that she would continue exhibiting these feelings and behaviors into 
adulthood, and it may not be reasonable to expect her to do otherwise, depending on the 
difficulty of overcoming the influences of her upbringing. Having an agent take responsibility in 
these circumstances would involve her attempting to see why she has this tendency to feel 
excessive guilt, and to see that the reasons why she has this tendency don’t justify her continuing 
to have it. Even if there is little she can do to alter these tendencies in herself, having an 
awareness of the origin of her guilt and the fact that it is unjustified is part of recognizing an 
aspect of herself as a moral agent.  
Compare this case with the following case of Susan Wolf’s: Suppose when visiting a 
friend’s home, someone accidentally breaks a vase. Let’s assume that she wasn’t particularly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 To put this point more carefully, the agent is to blame for exhibiting these dispositions only 
insofar as she could have reasonably been expected to have avoided or overcome them. 
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careless in doing so (say, for example, the vase was sitting on the floor) and so it is relatively 
clear that she isn’t at fault for breaking the vase. There is a tendency, I think, to class the person 
who feels excessive guilt together with the vase-breaker as both instances where agents lack 
responsibility and are not to blame for their actions or feelings because they are involuntary. I 
want to argue that there is an important distinction to be made between the two cases: in the case 
of the person who feels excessive guilt as a result of constitutive moral luck with respect to her 
upbringing, she is obligated to take responsibility for her emotion because if she fails to do so, 
she misses out on something important about herself. In contrast, it would presumably be 
appropriate for the person who accidentally breaks a vase to take responsibility (and for example, 
apologize), but if she fails to do so, she is perhaps rude, but not self-ignorant. As such, her taking 
responsibility in such a case would be supererogatory. 
My account also has consequences for cases of circumstantial moral luck where the 
agent’s circumstances affect the extent to which he can reasonably be expected to do otherwise. 
My account entails that in cases where agents could have been reasonably expected to do 
otherwise to the same degree, they are equally blameworthy, though differences in the 
consequences of their actions are reflected in differences in what they are responsible for. In 
classic instances of circumstantial moral luck where, for example, two drivers are equally 
negligent but one hits a pedestrian and one doesn’t, by my lights these agents are equally 
blameworthy because they are equally negligent. Moreover, they both ought to take 
responsibility for what they have done in the sense of attempting to explain and evaluate why 
they drove negligently. But in the case of the driver who hits someone, his taking responsibility 
also involves acknowledging what he alone has done, which was not just drive negligently but 
also hit a pedestrian. In virtue of his having hit a pedestrian, he incurs new responsibilities going 
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forward – perhaps, for example, to attempt to compensate the family of the person he hit. He 
cannot pretend that this event has nothing to do with him simply because he could have driven 
negligently and been lucky enough not to hit someone. Taking responsibility for something, then, 
involves not just factoring out the degree to which the consequences of our actions are up to us 
and accounting for those things we voluntarily chose to do. Rather, taking responsibility involves 
recognizing our place in the world as creatures with the ability to answer for actions and features 
of our psychology that are attributable to us, and that we find ourselves involved in whether we 
would have chosen to be so involved or not. 
This view about taking responsibility in contexts where what we have done was in large 
part not up to us is consonant with Susan Wolf’s view in “The Moral of Moral Luck”. She 
writes,  
“There is a virtue that I suspect we all dimly recognize and commend that may be 
expressed as the virtue of taking responsibility for one's actions and their consequences.  
It is, regrettably, a virtue with no name, and I am at a loss to suggest a name that would 
be helpful.  It involves living with an expectation and a willingness to be held 
accountable for what one does, understanding the scope of "what one does", particularly 
when costs are involved, in an expansive rather than a narrow way…” (Wolf 121) 
 
Although Wolf characterizes the disposition to take responsibility in this way as a virtue, I have 
here characterized it as a type of duty that one has at least in some cases where one is not to 
blame. I share her view, however, that insisting that we are only responsible for those things that 
are directly up to us is to draw a more or less arbitrary line around one’s voluntary actions and 
omissions and to mistakenly claim that one’s ethical life ends there. As she writes, 
“The reason for objecting quite generally to an attitude of greater detachment and for 
commending an embrace of at least some of what lies beyond the sphere of one's will has 
less to do with a benevolent concern for others than with a view about what, for lack of a 
better word, might be called psychic health.  The desirability of this [nameless virtue] 
comes partly from its expressing our recognition that we are beings who are thoroughly 
in-the-world, in interaction with others whose movements and thoughts we cannot fully 
control, and whom we affect and are affected by accidentally as well as intentionally, 
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involuntarily, unwittingly, inescapably, as well as voluntarily and deliberately…If we 
define ourselves in ways that aim to minimize the significance of contingency and luck, 
we do so at the cost of living less fully in the world, or at least at the cost of engaging less 
fully with the others who share that world” (Wolf 122-3). 
 
Finally, in cases where an agent is entirely blameless for some unfortunate event she 
finds herself entangled in, and the occurrence of this event shows nothing about her evaluative 
commitments, she may nevertheless feel terrible for having been part of the causal chain that 
brought it about. Take, for instance, the case of someone who accidentally hits a child who has 
run in front of her car. There is significant disagreement about whether or not feeling terrible 
about one’s role in such a case (i.e., agent-regret) is appropriate or rational. Regardless, it seems 
clear enough that this is not an instance of responsibility without blameworthiness as I have 
described it in this paper. When the person who might potentially experience agent-regret 
attempts to answer for her behavior, she will find that though she was involved in an unfortunate 
state of affairs, this involvement shows nothing about her. Some evidence for this is the fact that 
in cases like this, it seems sensible enough to say things like, “It could have happened to 
anyone,” where this sort of thinking would undermine the appropriateness of taking 
responsibility in the sense I have outlined. Still, if a person did not feel any regret over 
accidentally hitting a child, that person would strike us as callous and perhaps even to blame for 
her lack of emotion. There may be an appropriate response to such circumstances that 
approximates taking responsibility for them, but this response is nevertheless distinct from 
fulfilling the obligations that follow from our evaluative commitments. 
Conclusion 
 I have argued throughout this paper that there is an important sense of ‘moral 
responsibility’ that is appropriately ascribed to agents for bad actions, attitudes, and traits of 
character even when they are not to blame. In cases of “involuntary sins,” I have suggested 
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(contra Adams) that we are right to think that agents are not to blame for things outside of their 
control, though they still sometimes ought to take responsibility for them. In cases of 
psychopathology where agents have the general abilities necessary to answer for their behavior 
and features of their psychology, I have argued that this is enough for these agents to retain an 
important sense of responsibility that might well play an instrumental role in their recovery. 
Lastly, when considering the problem of moral luck, my approach has been to agree with those 
who think that agents who had the same things within their control when they acted wrongly 
(e.g., two equally negligent drivers) are equally blameworthy, but nevertheless, they must take 
responsibility for the consequences of those actions even when those consequences are not those 
they would have chosen. 
I think the sense of ‘responsibility’ I have discussed is one we recognize and use in 
ordinary practice, particularly in instances of role responsibility, as with the chancellor described 
above. Still, some of my suggestions about the relationship between responsibility and blame 
sound revisionary, even to my own ears, insofar as our practices of holding responsible are often 
bound up with other attitudes including praise and blame. I believe the cost of these revisions is 
well worth it, however, given the additional subtlety it buys us in terms of our evaluation of 
agents. I don’t mean to suggest that those who think responsibility and blame are often quite 
intimately connected are wrong; often agents with the ability to explain and evaluate their actions 
and features of their psychology could have reasonably been expected to avoid the bad states 
they find themselves in. Nevertheless, my aim here has been to show that even when agents meet 
excusing conditions for blame, they may well still be responsible, and ought to recognize that 
whether they would like to or not. 
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